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THE COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY IN HARPER V. 
POWAY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court decided Morse v. 
Frederick,l bringing the case better known as "Bong Hits 4 
Jesus" into widespread public attention. "Bong Hits" featured a 
familiar narrative-a rebellious student alleges persecution by 
his high school principal after a minor incident-which, when 
added to a relatively frivolous fact pattern and a headline-
grabbing nickname, placed the case in the spotlight. 
Beneath the public hype,2 however, lies a jurisprudential 
disappointment. In accepting Bong Hits, and refusing to accept 
a case where compelling school interests were in conflict with 
high-value student speech, the Court missed an opportunity to 
clarify important, unresolved dimensions of schoolhouse speech 
law. Instead of granting certiorari in Bong Hits, the Court 
should have decided a more important schoolhouse speech case 
last term: Harper v. Poway Unified School District.3 
What Harper lacked in a sexy nickname, it more than made 
up for in a compelling presentation of legal issues that school 
officials across the country need to have resolved. How much 
discretion do school officials have to restrict speech when they 
1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
2. Coverage in the Washington Post called Bong Hits "[t]he most important 
student free-speech conflict to reach the Supreme Court since the height of the 
Vietnam War." Robert Barnes, Justices to Hear Landmark Free-Speech Case, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 13, 2007, at A3. 
3. 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). Specifically, on March 5, 2007, the Court granted 
certiorari in Harper, vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanded with 
instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. Justice Breyer dissented without opinion. 
The mootness problem in Harper arose because Petitioner Harper had graduated from 
Poway High School. Suggestion of Mootness at 1, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 
127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007) (No. 06-595). The Court could have avoided this mootness 
problem, however, by granting Harper's younger sister's motion to intervene, as she is 
currently a student at Poway High. Harper, 127 S. Ct at 1484 (denying motion to 
intervene); see also Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist. 445 F.3d 1166, 1173 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
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fear substantial disruption to the school environment, 
especially post-Columbine? Is it ever possible for a student's 
words and writings alone to "invade the rights of others?" What 
should school officials do when presented with high-value 
speech that conflicts with their interest in school safety? 
In Part II we discuss Bong Hits, briefly outlining the factual 
background and summarizing the Supreme Court's decision. In 
Part III we argue that the Court's decision to accept Bong Hits 
was flawed because (1) the case presented a simplistic question 
pitting low-value speech against a high government interest 
and (2) the Court failed to provide any meaningful guidance on 
how to resolve closer cases. In Part IV we explain why Harper 
would have been a better case for the Court to decide, and offer 
a suggested resolution to a similar case if and when it comes 
before the Court in the future. 
II. HOW A CASE CALLED "BONG HITS" MADE IT TO THE SUPREME 
COURT 
A. The Simple Facts of Bong Hits 
On January 24, 2002, en route to the winter games and 
followed by television crews, the Olympic Torch Relay made its 
way through Juneau, Alaska.4 To Joseph Frederick, a senior 
attending Juneau-Douglas High School ("JDHS"), the television 
crews were particularly appealing.5 JDHS released its students 
to witness and participate in the event, though they were 
supervised by JDHS officials and teachers.6 
As the relay and camera crews passed in front of JDHS, 
Frederick joined7 a crowd of both students and non-studentsS 
observing the event and, along with several friends, unfurled a 
14-foot banner reading "BONG HITS 4 JESUS."9 Frederick has 
since stated that he displayed the banner "to be meaningless 
and funny, in order to get on television,"10 and that the 
4. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. 
5. Joint Appendix at 27-28, 66, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). 
6. !d.; Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). 
7. Frederick arrived at the event directly from home. Brief for the Petitioner, 
supra note 6, at 5; Brief for the Respondent at 2, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). 
8. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622; Brieffor the Respondent, supra note 7, at 2. 
9. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. 
10. Linda Greenhouse, Free-Speech Case Divides Bush and Religious Right, N.Y. 
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message "really did not have a meaning ... it was a parody and 
could be subjectively interpreted to mean whatever anyone 
want[ed] it to mean."ll 
Regardless of the banner's intended meaning, if any, JDHS 
Principal Deborah Morse did not take kindly to its display.12 
Upon seeing the banner, Morse approached Frederick and 
demanded that it be taken down.13 Frederick initially resisted, 
asking about his First Amendment rights and questioning 
whether he was on school grounds.l4 Morse then took the 
banner down and instructed Frederick to report to her office, 
where she suspended him for ten days.15 Morse justified the 
sanction on her belief that the banner was in violation of a 
Juneau School Board policy prohibiting expression that 
advocates the use of illegal substances.16 
Frederick administratively appealed his suspension to the 
School Superintendent.17 Though limiting the term to time 
served (eight days), the Superintendent upheld the 
suspension.lS Frederick next appealed to the Board of 
Education, which also upheld the suspension.19 Having 
exhausted his administrative remedies, Frederick brought suit 
against Morse and the Juneau School Board under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights and 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory 
damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.20 
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
granted summary judgment in favor of Morse and the Juneau 
School Board ("School Board"), holding that they were entitled 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at A22. 
11. Joe Frederick, Joe's Story, STRIKE THE ROOT, Nov. 17, 2003, 
http://www. strike-the-root.com/3/frederick/frederick 1. html. 
12. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. 
13. Id. 
14. Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 24-25; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, 
at 5. 
15. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. The suspension was subsequently reduced to eight 
days on administrative appeal. I d. at 2623. 
16. Id. at 2623 (stating that School Board Policy No. 5520 prohibits "any 
assembly or public expression that ... advocates the use of substances that are illegal 
to minors ... "); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 6; Brief for the Respondent, 
supra note 7, at 3-4. 
17. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623. 
18. Id. 
19. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 7, at 4. 
20. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623. 
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to qualified immunity and that they had not violated 
Frederick's First Amendment rights.21 In finding no First 
Amendment violation, the district court relied on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,22 
which, in the district court's view, "stated that it is the province 
of the [School] Board to determine what manner of speech ... 
is inappropriate."23 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
Frederick's speech should instead be analyzed under the 
Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District.24 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with 
the district court's application of Fraser, noting that "[o]ur case 
differs from Fraser in that Frederick's speech was not sexual [], 
and did not disrupt a school assembly."25 Because Morse and 
the School Board had not shown that the banner risked 
substantial disruption to the educational environment, which 
would have justified the suspension under Tinker, the court 
held that Frederick's free speech rights had been violated.26 
The Ninth Circuit further held that Morse and the School 
21. Id. 
22. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In Fraser, a high school student delivered a speech laced 
with sexual innuendo to a captive audience of 600 fellow students. The speech 
distracted several students in the audience and resulted in some yelling and graphic 
gestures. The school district reacted by disciplining the student for his use of "indecent" 
and "obscene" language. Id. at 677-79. In the resulting lawsuit, the student argued 
successfully in the Ninth Circuit that the district's language standards were overly 
vague and that his speech did not create a substantial disruption to the educational 
environment. Id. at 679-80. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "it is a highly 
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse." Id. at 683. The Court reasoned that sexual 
innuendo before a captive audience of adolescents was something a school reasonably 
could restrict. Id. at 685. 
23. Frederick v. Morse, No. J02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *5 (D. 
Alaska May 29, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006). 8ee generally Tinker 
v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S 503 (1969). In Tinker, a small group of 
high school students decided to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to 
school. When the school district heard of the plan, it adopted a policy prohibiting the 
wearing of all armbands. The students wore the armbands, were suspended from 
school, and filed suit claiming violation of their First Amendment free speech rights. 
Id. at 504. The Supreme Court ruled for the students. They retained their First 
Amendment speech rights within the schoolhouse walls, because there was "no 
evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work 
or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." Id. at 
508. 
25. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1119. 
26. Id. at 1123. 
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Board were not entitled to qualified immunity.27 
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis 
Rev8rsing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that 
"schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their 
care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as 
encouraging illegal drug use."28 The Court's holding did not 
result from an application of any of its prior school speech 
cases. At the outset, the Court determined that Hazelwood 
School District u. Kuhlmeier29 was not controlling because "no 
one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner bore the 
school's imprimatur."30 The opinion, written by Chief Justice 
Roberts, next discussed Fraser 31 and acknowledged that "[t]he 
mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear," 
leaving it open to multiple interpretations.32 Fraser could be 
read to focus on the sexual content of the speech, or it could be 
read to stand for the broader principle that "school boards have 
the authority to determine what manner of speech in the 
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate."33 However, 
the Court determined that it "need not resolve this debate to 
decide this case."34 
Instead of applying Tinker, its only remaining school speech 
case, the Court resolved Bong Hits by identifying a new 
category of speech that may be prohibited by the schools 
without any showing of a risk of substantial disruption: speech 
27. ld. at 1125. 
28. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007). 
29. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood, high school students writing for the school 
newspaper had several prospective articles censored by the principal. The school 
newspaper was published and taught for credit as the "Journalism II" class. The 
students claimed that their First Amendment rights to free speech in school were being 
violated. The principal believed that the articles, which were written about family 
divorce and student pregnancy issues, were inappropriate because they risked 
identifying members of the student body and thus showed a failure to master 
journalism principles taught in "Journalism II." Id. at 262-65. The Supreme Court held 
that the principal could reasonably restrict the speech because it was curricular, 
stating that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns." Id. at 273. 
30. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627. 
31. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
32. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626. 
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34. Id. 
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encouraging illegal drug use.35 In coming to this conclusion, 
the Court focused on the strong government interest in 
deterring drug use by schoolchildren.36 This interest, 
considered in light of the "special characteristics of the school 
environment,"37 "allow[s] schools to restrict student expression 
that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use."38 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito (joined by Justice 
Kennedy) effectively limited the scope of the Court's holding, 
making it clear that he joined the five justice majority opinion 
on the understanding that it would not support the restriction 
of speech which "[could] plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on 
issues such as the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing 
marijuana for medicinal use."39 Justice Alito sought to 
harmonize the Court's opinion with school speech precedent by 
explaining his view that "illegal drug use presents a grave and 
in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students," 
thus aligning the Court's ruling with Tinker's emphasis on 
avoiding violence and material disruption to the schools.40 
Justice Alito also made it clear that he did not endorse any 
reading of Fraser that gave school boards authority to censor 
student speech contrary to their self-defined educational 
missions.41 In particular, he expressed concern that "the 
'educational mission' argument would give public school 
authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social 
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed."42 
Justice Thomas concurred separately, providing a detailed 
review of pre- Tinker public education cases in support of his 
conclusion that "the First Amendment, as originally 
understood, does not protect student speech in public 
schools."43 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and dissented in 
35. ld. at 2622. 
36. ld. at 2628. 
37. ld. at 2629 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist .. 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969)). 
38. ld. 
39. ld. at 2636 (Alita, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40. ld. at 2638. 
41. ld. at 2637. 
42. ld. 
43. ld. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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the reasoning, expressing his view that the damage elements of 
the case should have been disposed of based on Morse and the 
School Board's qualified immunity, and that injunctive relief 
should have been denied because Frederick's suspension was 
justified for reasons other than the banner display. 44 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented on the 
grounds that Frederick's banner "neither violate[d] a 
permissible rule nor expressly advocate[d] conduct that is 
illegal and harmful to students."45 
III. A CRITICAL READING OF BONG HITS 
There are two major problems with the Court's decision to 
grant certiorari in Bong Hits. First, as discussed in Part III.A, 
the very fact that there are substantial arguments about 
whether this case was a schoolhouse speech case at all 
warrants serious doubt as to the Court's propriety in granting 
certiorari. Second, as discussed in Part III.B, Bong Hits 
presented an easy case in which a high government interest 
was weighed against low-value student speech. This dichotomy 
is too similar to Fraser, and accordingly Bong Hits could not be 
expected to help answer the more difficult question of how a 
case involving both high governmental interests and high-value 
speech should be resolved. Despite these concerns, the 
questionable wisdom of granting certiorari in Bong Hits might 
have been ameliorated had the Court provided helpful 
doctrinal guidance on how to resolve future, more difficult 
school speech cases. As discussed in Part III.C, the Court not 
only failed to provide meaningful guidance, it actually made 
this area of the law less clear. 
A. Bong Hits Shares None of the Special Characteristics that 
Warrant Reduced Student Speech Rights 
The first major problem with Bong Hits is that it's arguably 
not about school speech. The Court majority asserted that the 
Olympic torch relay was "school-sanctioned and school-
supervised,"46 while Frederick pointed out that his banner was 
not within school classrooms, hallways, or even official 
44. Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
45. Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 2622. 
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grounds, but was instead on a public thoroughfare, during a 
public event.47 Given the ambiguity, should the school speech 
precedents even apply? 
Our aim is not to rehash the factual dispute, but to look at 
the philosophical justification for why courts distinguish 
schoolhouse speech cases from other realms of speech. The 
courts have consistently justified students' reduced speech 
rights by looking to three "special characteristics of the school 
environment."48 Because Bong Hits satisfies none of these 
special characteristics, it is ultimately ill-suited to the line of 
schoolhouse speech cases it has joined. 
The first of these special characteristics is that schools have 
a substantial interest in protecting the physical safety of their 
students, well above the interest of the government in 
protecting the general public. 49 In Tinker, for example, the 
Court held that administrators had the authority to protect the 
educational environment from speech leading to substantial 
disruption or interference with the "rights of other students to 
be secure and let alone."50 Since Tinker, courts have uniformly 
held that speech threatening physical disruption can be 
suppressed. 51 
The second special characteristic is the immaturity of the 
audience: schools can protect captive adolescents from offensive 
speech, including sexual innuendo. This principle is 
exemplified in Fraser, where school officials sanctioned a 
student for a speech laced with sexual innuendo during a 
mandatory school assembly.52 The Court emphasized that 
captive audiences of immature high school students do not 
have to be forced to listen to "sexually explicit, indecent, or 
47. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 7, at 4, 8. 
48. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 39:3 U.S. fi03, 506 (1969). These 
special characteristics havE~ also warranted different Fourth Amendment rights for 
students in schools. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995): 
New ,Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, :336 (1985). 
49. See Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ .. 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 
1966) ("The proper operation of public school systems is one of the highest and most 
fundamental responsibilities of the state. The School authorities in the instant case 
had a legitimate and substantial interest in the orderly conduct of the school and a 
duty to protect such substantial interests in the school's operation.''). 
50. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
51. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Denno v. 
Sch. Bd. ofVolusia County, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000); West v. Derby Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
52. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (Hl86). 
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lewd speech" in the name of the First Amendment. 53 
The third special characteristic of schools is their need to 
control their curriculum. In Hazelwood, the Court held that 
schools do not have to sponsor certain student speech in the 
curricular setting.54 This ensures that schools can avoid 
association with any potentially-controversial student 
position. 55 
Bong Hits exhibits none of these special characteristics. 
Morse admitted that Frederick's banner in no way threatened 
disruption or the rights of others to be secure in the 
educational environment,56 so Tinker was inapplicable.57 The 
Ninth Circuit held that there was no sexual or otherwise 
plainly offensive speech involved, so Fraser was inapplicable.58 
Hazelwood was similarly unavailable, since "Frederick's pro-
drug banner was not sponsored or endorsed by the school, nor 
was it part of the curriculum, nor did it take place as part of an 
official school activity."59 
In Bong Hits, the Court several times recited the law's 
"special characteristics" mantra,60 yet still chose to apply-and 
modify-schoolhouse speech law around a situation that did 
not trigger any of the doctrine's fundamental assumptions. The 
Court lacked all of the philosophical justifications that have 
historically been used to rationalize reduced speech rights in 
school. Because there was no identified educational need for 
the suppression of a student's First Amendment rights, the 
Court should have used some other philosophical justification 
for analyzing Bong Hits in the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood line. 
53. Id. at 684; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274-75 
(1988). 
54. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272. 
55. Id. 
56. Brief of Appellant at 5, Frederick v. Morse, 439 F. 3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 
o::l-:35701). 
57. Frederick v. Morse, 4::l9 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006). In his concurrence, 
Justice Alito attempted to argue that speech that promotes illegal drug use is similar 
enough to physical disruption that it can be regulated under Tinher. See supra Part 
II. B. Although Justice Ali to's attempt to bring Bong Hits in line with precedent is 
welcome, his argument equating drug speech with physical disruption is a stretch. 
58. Frederick. 4:39 F.3d at 1119. 
59. Id. 
60. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625, 2629 (2007). 
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B. Bong Hits Presented an Easy Case, Balancing Significant 
Government Interests Against Low-Value Student Speech 
The second major problem with the Court's decision to 
grant cert in Bong Hits is that the case, like Fraser, presented 
yet another fact pattern in which a significant government 
interest was weighed against low-value student speech. To put 
it simply, Bong Hits was too easy a case for the Court to decide, 
since the governmental interest almost always wins in this fact 
pattern.61 It would be much more helpful to educators and 
attorneys for the Court to accept a case of high-value speech 
that runs in conflict with other fundamental characteristics of 
the school setting (e.g., high-value political speech that risks 
substantial disruption of the educational environment or 
invasion of the rights of other students). 
In Bong Hits, all parties agreed that the speech in question 
was of little value. Principal Morse argued that it "advertise[ d) 
or promote[d] use of illegal drugs."62 Frederick responded only 
that it was "meaningless and funny."63 The dissent danced 
around the meaning of the phrase "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" and 
described it as "curious," "ambiguous," "nonsense," "ridiculous," 
"obscure," "silly," "quixotic," and "stupid";64 it never labeled the 
message important, relevant, or worth any serious 
consideration. There was nothing of social or political value in 
Frederick's message. 
The respect courts assign to the speaker also bleeds into the 
value of the speech itself. Frederick was not exactly a model 
student at JDHS. Earlier that same year, he was disciplined 
for refusing to stand during the Pledge of Allegiance.65 While 
such challenges to authority might be respected when coming 
from a speaker defending sincerely held beliefs, Frederick does 
not appear to be such a speaker.66 The dissenting justices in 
Bong Hits could not come up with a better motive for 
61. See supra note 51. 
62. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 64. 
66. In fact, Frederick has claimed that he refused to stand for the pledge in 
response to an unfriendly exchange with a school Vice Principal the previous day. 
Frederick, supra note 11. Frederick later described his saga as "a story of a high school 
senior who refused to bow down in submission before an authority." Barnes, supra note 
2. 
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Frederick's actions during the torch relay than that "he just 
wanted to get on television."67 Even when attempting to invoke 
the First Amendment in his defense, Frederick's self-avowed 
motive is trivial: "We thought we had a free speech right to 
display a humorous saying, and that's all we were doing."68 
Frederick's appearance as a student who repeatedly challenged 
school officials to, at best, make trivial First Amendment points 
he did not particularly care about could not have helped the 
Court's perception that his speech was of little value, and likely 
made it more probable that the Court would find for Morse. 
The governmental interest at issue in Bong Hits was 
significant. Decisions have long recognized that there is an 
"important-indeed, perhaps compelling" governmental 
interest in deterring drug use by school children.69 The 
majority cited a number of studies, all demonstrating that "the 
[drug] problem remains serious today."70 Finally, the Court 
observed that Congress and "[t]housands of school boards 
across the country" have implemented policies and programs 
aimed at discouraging drug use by schoolchildren.71 
Bong Hits' low-value speech/high government interest 
dichotomy is quite similar to Fraser, where the "recognized [] 
interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and 
offensive spoken language"72 easily outweighed Fraser's right 
to express an "elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphor" to a captive audience of high school students.73 The 
Court repeatedly emphasized that Fraser's speech was low-
value through frequent sobering comments about the schools' 
role in teaching "fundamental values of habits and manners of 
civility."74 The Court also cast the speaker in a negative light 
by describing how teachers had warned him not to deliver the 
speech, and generally disparaged his decision to deliver a 
speech with sexual innuendo to adolescents. 75 
67. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649. 
68. Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 28. 
69. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 661 (1995)). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). 
73. !d. at 678. 
74. Id. at 681. 
75. !d. at 678. 
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Bong Hits and Fraser are essentially the opposite of Tinker, 
where protecting high-value political speech outweighed an 
insignificant government interest. In Tinker, a small group of 
students decided to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black 
armbands to school. 76 The students were very serious and 
chose a respectful, non-confrontational approach. 77 This 
political speech was balanced against the school's illegitimate 
interest in "avoid[ing] the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."78 Unsurprisingly, 
the Court held that school officials had violated the students' 
First Amendment rights, and could not suspend students for "a 
silent passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any 
disorder or disturbance."79 
The Court's categorical approach impedes establishment of 
a functional body of schoolhouse speech law. It is just too easy 
to hold that significant government interests allow schools to 
suppress low-value speech. The lack of a serious countervailing 
principle means that the Court can avoid the challenging 
issues that educators actually face, like what to do when a 
serious, controversial speaker risks sparking a physical 
disruption. As a conservative advocacy organization said in its 
amicus brief, "It would be regrettable if the Court were to 
resolve the important questions of constitutional law at issue 
here in the context of a jokester's prank, rather than a 
student's bearing of a serious message."SO 
What educators and lawyers need is for the Court to weigh 
in upon the following situation: a respectful, respected student 
attempts to speak on important, political issues, yet is silenced 
by administrators fearing substantial disruption or 
interference with the rights of other students. Even if the 
Court were to uphold the student's punishment, as in Bong 
Hits, the legal value to school administrators and their lawyers 
would be dramatically different. It strains credulity to believe 
that Justice Thomas would have written the same Bong Hits 
concurrence-that students lack all free speech rights in 
76. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:1. 504 (1969). 
77. Id. at 508. 
78. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (quoting Tinher, 393 U.S. at 
509). 
79. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
80. Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 4, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). 
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schoolsSl-if the speech in question was religious or politically 
conservative (e.g., "Mfirmative Action is shameful"). 
C. The Court Failed to Use Bong Hits as an Opportunity to 
Clarify Schoolhouse Speech Jurisprudence 
Like Justice Breyer, we "cannot find much guidance in [the 
Court's] decision."S2 Having decided to take this questionable 
case, the Court could have at least provided meaningful 
guidance as to how future, closer cases of student speech 
suppression in the public schools should be resolved. 
To be sure, Bong Hits did answer some questions in what 
the Second Circuit recently called "the unsettled waters of free 
speech rights in public schools."83 All members of the Court 
agreed that, even if Frederick's speech was protected, Morse 
would have been entitled to qualified immunity.84 The Court 
also resolved at least one lingering question about Fraser: the 
decision "should not be read to encompass any speech that 
could fit under some definition of 'offensive."'S5 
But this minor clarification pales in comparison to the 
critical question the Court decided it "need not resolve": 
whether Fraser is limited to speech that is sexual in nature, or 
whether it stands for the broader principle that "school boards 
have the authority to determine what manner of speech in the 
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate."86 Not only 
has this debate divided the circuits,87 it was the very question 
that divided the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Bong 
Hits.88 While Justice Alita's rejection of this broader reading of 
81. Morse. 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "the 
Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools"). 
82. Id. at 2640 (Bwyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). Breyer suggested that the Court rule on qualified immunity grounds and thus 
avoid the underlying schoolhouse speech question. Id. at 2638. 
83. Guiles ex rei. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 2006). 
84. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629. 
85. Id. at 2629. 
86. Id. at 2626 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 
(19R6)). 
87. Compare Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Fraser 
focuses upon the sexual nature of the offensiveness in the in-school speech that can be 
punished ... . ").with Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F. 3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 
2000) ("The Supreme Court has held that the school board has the authority to 
determine 'what manner of speech in the classroom or in school is inappropriate."' 
(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:1 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986))). 
88. See supra Part I I.A. 
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Fraser89 is helpful, and may well guide its interpretation in the 
future, the Court's failure to produce a majority opinion on this 
important point is lamentable. 
Compounding the problem of not resolving this key debate 
over Fraser's proper interpretation, the Court also chose not to 
apply its only other potentially relevant school speech 
precedent, Tinker.90 Instead, to quote Justice Stevens, the 
Court "invent[ed] out of whole cloth a special First Amendment 
rule permitting the censorship of any student speech that 
mentions drugs, at least so long as someone could perceive that 
speech to contain a latent pro-drug message."91 Carving out a 
third exception to Tinker (after Fraser and Hazelwood) for 
illegal drug promotion provides little future guidance to school 
administrators and their attorneys. As Justice Thomas aptly 
put it, "[The Court's] jurisprudence now says that students 
have a right to speak in schools except when they don't."92 
Creating this third exception also leaves important 
questions about how to apply Tinker's test unanswered. For 
example, when is a forecasted disruption substantial enough to 
warrant suppressing student speech? What did Tinker mean 
when it said that speech that interferes with "the rights of 
other students to be secure and to be let alone" may be 
suppressed?93 Interestingly, the Bong Hits opinion appears to 
have actually increased the uncertainty surrounding this 
"rights of others" prong. Unlike in Fraser and Hazelwood, 
neither the majority nor any of the concurring opinions 
included the rights of others language in their descriptions of 
Tinker's holding.94 This omission is puzzling in light of the 
lower courts' clear recognition of the rights of others prong as 
an independent element under Tinker,95 and calls into question 
future attempts to rely on it in the Tinker analysis. 
We have serious doubts that Bong Hits was worth Supreme 
Court review. It failed to fall under any of the traditional 
i-\9. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ali to, .J ., concurring). 
90. Id. at 2626 (majority opinion). 
91. Id. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
(J2. !d. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
9:!. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
94. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622-43. 
9fi. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(Ali to .. J .. writing for the court) ("The precise scope of Tinker's 'interference with the 
rights of others' languagP is unclear."). 
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special circumstances that warrant reduced speech rights in 
school, presented an easy case m which significant 
governmental interests were weighed against low-value 
student speech, and is of marginal utility to educators. Tyler 
Chase Harper, however, did not have a frivolous message and 
was not labeled a drug dealer by the school. His respectful yet 
challenging speech would have presented the Court with a 
more difficult and meaningful case of balancing First 
Amendment rights with school safety. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED HARPER V. POWAY 
INSTEAD OF BONG HITS 
As we will see, Harper touches upon very serious public 
issues of gay rights, religious expression, and student speech 
inside school walls. In Part IV.A, we review Harper's facts. In 
Part IV.B, we discuss why Harper, unlike Bong Hits, would 
have required the Court to address and resolve some of the 
most difficult and important issues in school speech law. In 
Part IV.C, we suggest a way for the Court to resolve such a 
difficult high government interest, high-value speech case. 
A. The Simple Facts of Harper v. Poway 
Poway High School ("Poway") had a history of conflict and 
disruption surrounding sexual orientation issues.96 During the 
2003 "Day of Silence," an annual student-led event raising 
awareness of discrimination against homosexuals, "volatile 
behavior," including an altercation that required Principal 
Scott Fisher to physically separate students, broke out among 
students.97 A week later, an unexpected "Straight Pride Day," 
involving "inflammatory," anti-homosexual messages on hand-
printed t-shirts, resulted in an altercation, personal conflicts, 
and several suspensions.98 Principal Fisher, fearing future 
physical conflicts, met with student leaders and attempted to 
96. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist. 445 F. 3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006). 
97. Excerpts of Record at 149, 152, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 44ii F.:Jd 
1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-57037). 
98. !d. at 152, 1.57. These larger incidents aside, disruption around sexual 
orientation issues was a daily occurrence at Poway. Several homosexual students 
recently successfully sued Poway for failing to provide a safe environment and 
permitting numerous forms of anti-homosexual harassment. Harper, 445 F. 3d at 1172, 
n.6. 
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"problem-solve" the tension.99 
On the 2004 Day of Silence, Tyler Chase Harper, a 
sophomore at Poway and a devout Christian, 100 decided to 
express his opposition to the Day of Silence.lOl Harper believed 
that homosexual behavior was "destructive to humankind ... 
immoral, damaging to the practitioners and to human society 
in general,"102 and that the school was "advocating the 
homosexual lifestyle."103 He wore a t-shirt with "I WILL NOT 
ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" taped on the front, 
and "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL" taped on the back, 
with a biblical citation.104 Apparently, no one noticed.105 The 
next day he changed the t-shirt message to read "BE 
ASHAMED OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS 
CONDEMNED" on the front, and "HOMSEXUALITY IS 
SHAMEFUL" on the back, again followed by a biblical 
citation.106 
With this new message, Harper got a rise out of his fellow 
students, and was "confronted by a group of students on 
campus" that very morning, resulting in a "tense verbal 
conversation.''107 Soon afterward, his teacher noticed that 
Harper's t-shirt had "caused a disruption" in the classroom.108 
The teacher thought that Harper's t-shirt "created a negative 
and hostile working environment for others," and sent Harper 
to the front office.109 
Harper may not have realized how seriously administrators 
would take his t-shirt. Just two hours earlier, a "very upset" 
man claiming to be a parent had called the school and 
threatened them for "condoning" the Day of Silence.llO The 
caller said that he and others had "had it" and "would be doing 
something about it."111 He "said he was coming to campus that 
99. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 152. 
100. ld. at 5. 
101. ld. at 6. 
102. ld. at 5. 
103. ld. at 185. 
104. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 116(i. 1171 (8th Cir. 2006). 
105. ld. 
106. Id. 
107. ld. at 1171. 
108. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 156. 
108. Id. at 157. 
llO. ld. at lfi9. 
111. ld.; Harper, 445 F.3d at 1173, n. 7. 
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day," causing administrators to fear for the safety of the 
school.112 The administrators called to get their assigned 
deputy sheriff on campus as soon as possible.ll ;) When Harper 
arrived in the office they thought his situation might be related 
and were concerned that his t-shirt might incite violence.114 
Several school officials spoke with Harper. The school's 
deputy sheriff briefly met with Harper to document the t-shirt 
and assess the potential for violence.l15 The deputy sheriff 
warned the school officials that, in his opinion, Harper's t-shirt 
"could lead to disruption between the students."l16 Assistant 
Principal Edward Giles chatted with Harper about their shared 
faith-they had previously attended the same church for some 
years-and empathized that school employees also had to be 
careful about expressing disruptive beliefs in a work 
environment.117 He suggested that Harper make the message 
more "non-confrontational," and encouraged him to become an 
officer of the Bible Club. US 
Principal Fisher spoke with Harper about the physical 
dangers that could result from Harper's t-shirt, and how 
inflammatory Harper's particular choice of language was to 
other students, but Harper would not change his t-shirt or 
remove the tape.119 Principal Fisher had Harper remain in the 
front office, gave him credit for attendance, and did not 
suspend him or place anything in his disciplinary file.120 
Harper did not display the t-shirt message again, and Poway 
did not further discipline Harper.121 
Soon thereafter, Harper filed a complaint alleging that 
Poway violated his First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech.l22 He requested preliminary and permanent 
mJunctions prohibiting the school from "violating [his] 
constitutional rights by selectively banning religious expression 
112. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 1 fi4. 
Jl:l. !d. at 159. 
114. !d. at 154. 
115. Irl. at 165. 
1lfi. !d. at 166. 
117. !d. at 160, 162; Harper, 445 F. 3d at ll7:1. 
11~. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 162. 
119. !d. at 149. 
120. Jd. at 1fi0. 
121. llarper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., :H5 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 
2004). 
122. /d. 
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in school," declaratory judgment against Poway's policies and 
actions, nominal damages, punitive damages, and civil 
penalties.12::l 
In November 2004, the district court denied Harper's 
motion for preliminary injunction largely on Tinker's 
substantial disruption grounds.124 The court held that Harper 
"failed to demonstrate he [would] succeed on the merits of his 
claims."125 Additionally, because Poway still needed to protect 
school safety and the rights of other students, the court held 
that "the balance of hardships [did] not tip sharply in 
[Harper's] favor."l26 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
denial of the preliminary injunction.127 The Ninth Circuit 
agreed that Harper did not demonstrate a likelihood of success 
on the merits of his free speech claim because Harper's speech 
intruded upon the rights of other students to be secure and let 
alone.128 Harper petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.129 The Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth 
Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to 
dismiss the appeal as moot because Harper had already 
graduated from Poway.130 
B. The Supreme Court Missed an Opportunity to Resolve the 
Conflict Between High- Value Speech and Compelling 
Government Interests 
Harper presented a remarkable opportunity for the Court to 
improve and clarify existing schoolhouse speech law. There is 
no doubt that Harper belongs in the school speech line of cases. 
Harper's t-shirt provoked a tense confrontation in school 
hallways and created a disruptive working environment in the 
classroom.l :31 
123. Excerpts of Hecord. supra note 97, at 17. 
124. Harper, :)41) F. Supp. 2d at 1120. 
125. Id. at 1119. 
126. Id. at 1122. 
127. Harper. 445 F.:>d at 1171. 
128. Id. at 1175. 
129. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). 
130. Id. (stating that the district court had alrt>ady entered final judgment 
dismissing Harper's claims as moot); Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 3. at 1 
(stating that the District Court had dismissed Harper's equitable claims as moot 
because Harper had graduated from high school and thus no longer had standing). 
131. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., :345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, ll20 (S.D. Cal. 
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Harper thus triggers two of the 'special circumstances' that 
schoolhouse speech law recognizes as justifications for reduced 
speech in schools. Administrators, teachers, and others 
believed that Harper's speech would result in substantial 
disruption to the educational environment, as in Tinker.1:12 
They also believed that Harper's t-shirt presented offensive 
speech to a captive audience (the classroom), as in Fraser.l:33 
While Justice Alito called Bong Hits "at the far reaches" of 
schoolhouse speech regulation, 1 :H Harper falls clearly under 
multiple prongs of traditional doctrine. 
Harper also placed high-value speech from a respected 
speaker in conflict with important government interests. 
Administrators thought that Harper's t-shirt could provoke 
disruption, but they also believed that Harper was genuine in 
his belief and respectful of school officials.135 This was part of 
Principal Fisher's motivation in declining to discipline Harper 
through suspension or notation in his record.l36 He did not 
have any other disciplinary record or questionable activities.I:37 
Thus, it is probable that the Court would have described him 
and his message with respect. The Court would have been 
presented with important government interests already 
recognized as worthy of restricting speech in schools: physical 
disruption, interference with the rights of others, and offensive 
speech in front of captive adolescents. 
The combination of high-value speech and compelling 
governmental interests would be much more difficult to resolve 
and correspondingly should produce an opinion more valuable 
to educators. Harper places uniformly recognized values-free 
speech and children's safety-in direct conflict.138 This 
situation confuses conventional political lines and would make 
predicting the Court's decision difficult. 
2004); ExcPrpts of Record, supra note 97, at 156. 
132. See Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 149-50, 156-57, 162, 166. 
133. See id. at 149; Harper, 445 F. 3d at 117H. 
134. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007). 
1:35. Harper, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1100-01. 
136. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 50. In fact, later on school 
administrators expressed their sympathy for Harper, who may have been pressured 
into his speech by conservative religious organizations looking for a test case. 
Statemlmt.s of Poway School Officials, Speech at Stanford Law School (March 15, 2007). 
I :37. Statements of Poway School Officials, supra note 136. 
1:38. Recognized values to everyone except .Justice Thomas, perhaps. Morse, 127 S. 
Ct. at 26:10 (Thomas. J., concurring). 
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Conservatives on the Court, for example, may be more 
interested in promoting religious speech and politically-
conservative messages that challenge perceived school 
endorsement of homosexuality. Yet they may also be more 
prone to public safety arguments and 'command and control' 
methods increasingly popular in schools, which would clamp 
down on speech like Harper's. On this side, the Court would 
hear data on the modern dangers facing schools, including a 
perception of increased school shootings and educators' new 
tools of violence prediction. '"Reading, writing and arithmetic' 
must now make room for phrases like 'threat assessment 
approach' and 'school-wide lock down."'l:39 The Court would 
also hear about how educators are placed in the unenviable 
position of trying to identify dangerous students and pinpoint 
when they must step in to prevent harm.l40 These arguments 
may encourage conservative Justices to find Poway officials 
justified in protecting the school environment. 
The liberals on the Court would also face ideological 
conflicts. Some Justices may agree with Judge Reinhardt of the 
Ninth Circuit that Harper's speech was threatening and 
demeaning to homosexual students.141 The Court would look to 
data on the challenges facing young homosexual students, 
including social isolation, academic underachievement, and 
high dropout rates.142 On the other hand, the liberal Justices 
would also be more likely to welcome greater speech rights in 
the school environment. They may be persuaded by advocates 
arguing that schools have given in to post-Columbine fears of 
harmless speech sparking a school shooting. "[S]ince the fall of 
1999, as schools reopened for the first post-Littleton school 
year, [the ACLU has] been seeing even more measures that are 
turning schools into fortresses and students into prisoners. All 
across the country, ACLU offices have been receiving 
complaints from students and parents in record-setting 
numbers."148 
139. Richard C. Demerle, Note, The New Scylla and Charybdis: Student Speech us. 
Student Safety After Columbine, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L .• J. 428, 429 (20(ll). 
140. See Mary Ellen O'Toole, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, 
http :1 /www .fbi. gov/pu blica tions/ school/ school2. pdf. 
141. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006). 
142. ld. 
143. Nadine Strossen, Keeping the Constitution Inside the Schoolhouse Gate-
Students' Rights Thirty Years After Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 462 (2000). 
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Each member of the Court would be faced with a classic 
dilemma: encourage the substantive speech itself at the risk of 
a disagreeable long-term legal rule, or set a legal rule that 
discourages the sympathetic speaker yet broadens the door for 
future advocacy? Regardless of the outcome, resolving this kind 
of conflict with Harper's unconventional facts wou'd have been 
of higher value than Bong Hits' summary affirmation of school 
officials' authority to participate in the War on Drugs.144 In the 
future, the Court should accept a more challenging case, giving 
educators facing difficult situationsl45 guidance on how 
conflicting interests in the educational environment must be 
resolved. 
C. A Proposal for the Resolution of the Difficult Issues Harper 
Presents in the Future 
We have argued that the Court should have decided Harper 
v. Poway on its merits and used the case to provide guidance as 
to how to balance strong government interests against high-
value speech. We would be remiss, however, in describing the 
ways in which Harper was a better choice without providing 
our own form of guidance, namely, a suggestion for a way to 
resolve Harper. 
A nonpolitical legal solution to the high-value speech/high 
government interest dilemma is suggested in Justice Breyer's 
Bong Hits partial concurrence and dissent. Breyer notes that 
the "surrounding context and manner" of Frederick's speech 
also seemed important to Morse's decision to remove the 
banner.146 "To say that school officials might reasonably 
prohibit students during school-related events from unfurling 
14-foot banners (with any kind of irrelevant or inappropriate 
message) designed to attract attention from television cameras 
seems unlikely to undermine basic First Amendment 
principles."l47 We propose extending this context and manner 
argument not just for low-value speech, but as a tiebreaker for 
high-value speech that also implicates an important 
government interest like public safety. 
144. Especially given the reduced Fourth Amendment and due process rights 
students are entitled to in schools. See supra note 49. 
145. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 ("School principals have a difficult 
job, and a vitally important one."). 
146. !d. at 26:31' (Breyer, .J., concurring). 
147. !d. 
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A manner rationale is based in the Court's Fraser decision, 
which explicitly noted that "[n]othing in the Constitution 
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of 
expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions."148 
Lower courts have also taken note of manner-type themes: the 
district court in Harper, for example, observed, "[T]here is 
nothing in the record to suggest [Harper] would not be free to 
proselytize any religious view or any other viewpoint in a 
manner that does not violate neutral and valid school 
policies."149 
Indeed, other evidence suggests that Poway's decision to 
suppress Harper's speech was largely influenced by Harper's 
manner of speaking. Administrators believed that derogatory 
phrases taped on his t-shirt would give classmates the short, 
provocative aspect of Harper's message without his underlying 
devout, respectful beliefs.150 They also believed that having a 
message on a t-shirt was an improper manner of speaking 
because it forced other students to sit and view it in the 
classroom, distracting them from their rights to be secure and 
let alone, and risking disruption of the primary educational 
environment.151 
In a 2007 speech, school officials described how they found 
a way for Harper to communicate his message in a more 
controlled, effective manner.152 During the next year's Day of 
Silence, administrators gave Harper an opportunity to speak to 
interested students.15:3 They set up a small platform for him in 
the school's usual space for students to gather during lunch.154 
The situation avoided short t-shirt messages, giving students 
an opportunity to hear the full extent of Harper's beliefs. The 
location was also important: being outside of the classroom, 
students could opt-in to Harper's talk during time not reserved 
for schoolwork.155 Administrators were on hand to ensure that 
Harper did not incite his fellow students and that violence did 
148. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 4 78 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (emphasis 
added). 
149. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1122 (S.D. Cal. 
2004) (emphasis added). 
150. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 162 (Declaration of Edward L. Giles). 
151. I d. at 153, 156 (Declarations of Lynell Antrim and David Lee LeMaster). 
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not erupt.l56 Harper spoke for ten to fifteen minutes without 
incident.157 
Poway's manner-based approach here benefited most, but 
not all parties. Several students heard Harper's perspective, 
teachers worked in an uninterrupted environment, and 
administrators avoided their nightmare of physical violence. 
Perhaps the only person that came out worse-off was Harper 
himself. When he was done, Harper looked visibly disappointed 
that others did not care enough to engage with his viewpoint, 
either in agreement or disagreement.l58 
Using manner as a tiebreaker helps avoid encouraging 
First Amendment martyrs. When administrators clamp down 
on speech, the resulting outrage and claims of suppression lead 
to lawsuits and a sense of martyrdom in the name of securing 
Constitutional rights. Thoughtful school administrators know 
that their actions can backfire and actually encourage more 
speech, risking further disruption. We suggest that in close 
calls, students should be allowed to speak in conformance to 
guidelines on appropriate methods of communication, allowing 
all sides to achieve their goals. By providing guidelines for how 
students may present their viewpoints, schools can encourage 
high-value student speech while still protecting compelling 
government interest in student safety. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Bong Hits was certainly not "[t]he most important student 
free-speech conflict to reach the Supreme Court since the 
height of the Vietnam War."159 While Bong Hits had an 
interesting set of facts and appealed to a broad audience, it did 
nothing to clarify or resolve important issues relating to 
student speech restrictions. The opinion will become an 
asterisk to traditional schoolhouse speech law, carving out a 
small exception for low-value speech promoting illegal drug 
use. In contrast, Harper presented a novel issue of student 
speech restriction: what happens when high-value student 
speech is in conflict with a compelling government interest? 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Statements of Poway School Officials, supra note 136. 
159. Barnes, supra note 2. 
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In the future, we hope that the Court will accept a case 
similar to Harper. When it does, we suggest that the Court look 
to the practice of Poway educators and use the manner and 
context of the speech as a tiebreaker. The practical solution of 
Poway school administrators led to a careful, appropriate, and 
we believe Constitutional means of balancing speech and 
safety. 
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